Our discussion of the nature of knowledge, then, considers the types of knowledge typically identified in debates about learning. At this point, we will outline the positions taken by theorists of composition and literary understanding regarding the necessity and sufficiency of general, task-specific, and community-specific knowledge. Three points before we begin: First, we are focusing on a specific kind of composing-the production of extended written discourse of the sort typically written and read in schools and in professional life-and a specific kind of reading-the reading of imaginative literature. Second, our discussion of knowledge does not include a discussion of grammatical knowledge because both readers and writers unquestionably transfer such basic knowledge from situation to situation. (See Hillocks & Smith, 1991, for a discussion of instructional issues related to grammar.) Third, we are attempting to clarify and to illustrate the three positions we have identified, rather than to provide a comprehensive survey of literacy research informed by these positions. We have thus circumscribed the issues in order to make them manageable within the limitations of a single essay.
Composition
The Argument for General Knowledge
The assumption that general knowledge is sufficient for most composing needs has driven practice for many years. The primary instructional tool involving general composing knowledge has been the general expository model as outlined in books such as Warriner and Griffith's (1977) English Grammar and Composition: Complete Course, which Applebee (1986) describes as "the most widely used composition text today" (p. 95). This Heritage edition of Warriner and Griffith's, for instance, informed the secondary student that.
Most of the writing you are required to do in school-tests, reports, essays-is expository, and most of the writing you will do after you leave school will be of this kind.
No matter what you are writing about, the basic steps involved in writing are almost always the same. They should become so familiar that you will follow them habitually whenever you write. (p. 339)
The steps outlined by the text include selecting and limiting a topic, assembling materials, organizing and outlining ideas, writing a draft that follows a particular form (usually including five paragraphs), revising, and preparing a final draft.
Many might arch a skeptical eyebrow concerning the clairvoyance of Warriner and Griffith regarding the type of writing most people will produce both in and, particularly, beyond school. Although a staple of instructional practice for many years, the five-paragraph theme has fallen into disrepute among academics. The most scathing criticism comes from Emig (1971) in her famous fifty-star theme derogation in which she calls it an "essentially redundant form, devoid, or duplicating, of content in at least two of its five parts . . . the assumption [being] that freshman English is a monolith, rather than a hydra-headed monster ... " (pp. 97-98). Emig was concerned that the form itself was incommodious to the many and various needs of writers and that the instructional emphasis was on product instead of process.
A final problem, and the one that we focus on in the present exposition, concerns the assumption about the extent to which people can transfer general knowledge, whether of product or of process, to novel situations. Warriner and Griffith's (1977) text and similar texts instructed for many years from the premise that one composi-tion is much like the next and that knowledge of a general text form will enable students to reproduce the single essential text structure successfully and abundantly. This assumption about the widespread applicability of the five-paragraph theme structure still influences many secondary teachers of our acquaintance who practice it both by choice and by department and school board mandate.
The assumption about the widespread applicability of general composing knowledge related to essay form affects current practice in other ways as well. "Style checker" computer programs, for instance, are produced by a number of companies, including the venerable Modern Language Association, suggesting the existence of both a strong market and an authoratative belief in the power of general knowledge. Such programs are designed to suggest areas of improvement for any composition submitted to them; they flag what they perceive as problems regardless of the rhetorical demands of particular pieces. These programs, in spite of their popularity, are routinely criticized for their assumptions about the general nature of composing knowledge. When evaluating the Gettysburg Address, for instance, they offer the predictably comical suggestion that the author should be more concise, subverting the unique rhetorical demands of Lincoln's oratory to the general prescription that writers should avoid being wordy.
Faith in the sufficiency of general knowledge of text structure is rare among the professoriate and has been replaced by a belief in general procedural knowledge that has begun to transform teaching and textbooks. One instructional tool for imparting general composing procedures is the heuristic, which is a general probe, usually in the form of a question, that points the writer towards some aspect of composing. Several researchers and theorists have investigated the use of heuristics as a general tool for improving writing. Larson (1968) , for instance, proposed a plan for teaching rhetorical invention through the development of an extensive set of questions that writers might apply to their compositions. In the area of "Writing about Propositions" (p. 133), for example, he identified such questions as "What must be established for the reader before he will believe it?" and "To what line of reasoning is it apparently a conclusion?" (p. 133). Similarly, Odell (1976) has developed a set of general questions-such as, "contrast" (p. 80) questions: "In what ways is X different from other things I know?" (p. 80). The sorts of heuristics developed by Larson and Odell have been studied by several researchers (Burns, 1980; Dutch, 1980; Ebbert, 1980; Lamberg, 1974; Odell, 1974; Young & Koen, 1973 ) who have achieved mixed results regarding their effectiveness in improving writing, with the results often called into question by the studies' dubious means of control (i.e., confounding variables in the treatment design). Hillocks (1986a) nonetheless finds their promise "encouraging" (p. 180) and suggests that they be investigated further.
Despite their potential, heuristics have been supplanted in popularity by general procedures for producing texts that rely on nonlinear thinking such as brainstorming, clustering, and free writing. Among the foremost advocates of these nonlinear procedures has been Murray (1980 Murray ( , 1987 , who refers to "the process approach to writing" (1987, p. 6) as consisting of five steps: collecting, focusing, ordering, developing, and clarifying. Writers can apply this general process to any composing problem and couple the five steps with general strategies such as free writing, brainstorming, and mapping. "Freewriting," maintains Murray, "is just as valuable a technique to use as a starting point for a term paper, a historical essay, or a review of scientific literature" (1987, p. 42). Free writing, he argues, is a fundamental tool for Smagorinsky and Smith unearthing that which one has to express: It "makes writing easier by helping you with the root psychological or existential difficulty in writing: finding words in your head and putting them down on a blank piece of paper" (p. 14).
The most passionate proponent of general procedures undoubtedly has been Elbow (1973 Elbow ( , 1981 , who has written extensively and with considerable influence about the seemingly endless benefits of free writing. He describes two general writing procedures. One is the direct writing process, which he recommends "for tasks like memos, reports, somewhat difficult letters, or essays where I don't want to engage in much new thinking" (1981, p. 26). The direct writing process "is very simple. Just divide your available time in half. The first half is for fast writing without worrying about organization, language, correctness or precision. The second half is for revision" (p. 26).
The second process is the loop writing process: The assumption behind this conception of composing knowledge is that writing consists of a very few simple procedures that one develops and uses effectively through practice. "The voyage out" is serviceable regardless of particular navigational problems of the myriad tasks one endeavors or of the gravitational fields one enters; it will guide explorers through meteor showers, black holes, intense solar heat, and Klingon attacks with equal dexterity. The position holds that, while one might need particular content knowledge to write about Freud or the French Revolution, one's process in executing the tasks or approaching the topics needn't vary. Murray's (1987) ) achieved significant gains through treatments involving free writing, yet a great number of studies has found no significant improvement between treatments involving free writing and control treatments (Adams, 1971; Arthur, 1981; Baden, 1974; Davis, 1979; Delaney, 1980; Dreussi, 1976; Fox, .1980; Ganong, 1975; Gauntlett, 1978; Norwood, 1974; Reynolds, 1981; Walker, 1974; Witte & Faigley, 1981) . The body of experimental research may be questionable for a number of reasons. Newkirk (1987) points out that the bulk of the studies has not been published in refereed journals, suggesting a general lack of rigor. Hillocks (1986a) identifies flaws in the design of some studies, such as a lack of pretests. He also points out that researchers have constructed varying definitions of free writing in the design of the different studies, thus making the procedure and its effects difficult to pinpoint. Furthermore, at times, treatments in the control groups were not explicated; at other times, they were identified only as traditional instruc-tion-presumably, grammar instruction, the study of model essays, and so onresulting in the sort of apples and oranges comparisons that are of little value. Thus, the experimental research on the effectiveness of general procedures, such as free writing, is inconclusive.
Perhaps the most widely embraced body of research supporting general composing procedures has come from Graves (1979a Graves ( , 1979b Graves ( , 1979c Graves ( , 1980 Graves ( , 1981a Graves ( , 1981b Graves ( , 1983 and his associates (Calkins, 1979 (Calkins, , 1980a (Calkins, , 1980b (Calkins, , 1981 Kamler, 1980; Sowers, 1979 ; for a critical analysis, see Barrs, 1983; Hillocks, 1984 Hillocks, , 1986a Hillocks, , 1986b Smagorinsky, 1987) . Graves, concerned that experimental research is "boring" (1979b, p. 76) and "smells of musty bookcases and crusty language" (p. 76), chose instead a case study method of examining Piagetian stages of writing development among elementary school children. Maintaining that "Research in education is not a science" (1979a, p. 917), he chose a more ethnographic approach that he believed would better examine the processes engaged in by writers and that would not simply rely on written products to illuminate the complexity of the writing process. Graves found that elementary school students could learn general procedures for topic selection (optimally focusing on personal experiences), text generation (i.e., writing a series of leads or possible opening lines), and unconstrained drafting of texts that follow many of the same principles of process advocated by Murray (1987) and Elbow (1973) . Even though the studies by Graves have been criticized for their lack of internal consistency (i.e., they purport to be investigating developmental stages, yet student behavior is influenced deliberately by teacher interventions; Smagorinsky, 1987), they remain the most widely cited research base to support the benefits of general procedural composing knowledge. The general knowledge position, then, has focused on both form and procedures, with the focuses greatly at odds. Murray, for instance, has offered the searing opinion that "The process of making meaning with written language cannot be understood by looking backward from a printed page. Process cannot be inferred from product any more than a pig can be inferred from a sausage" (1980, p.3). Yet the two focuses do share a common assumption that general knowledge is sufficient and that writers can transfer it spontaneously from situation to situation with relative ease. Murray maintains that the process approach to writing "can be adapted by our students to whatever writing tasks face them-the memo, the poem, the textbook, the speech, the consumer complaint, the job application, the story, the essay, the personal letter, the movie script, the accident report, the novel, the scientific paper" (1980, p. 20). While Murray has broadened the range of forms through which people express themselves from expository to other types of writing and has shifted the instructional emphasis from product to process, he asserts that knowledge of how to produce all types of compositions springs from the same source and applies broadly to them all.
For teachers, then, composition instruction emanating from the general knowledge position is concerned with providing students with a set of forms and/or procedures that will presumably serve them well as they move from topic to topic and from class to class. Those advocating a procedural emphasis tend to focus on methods for topic discovery, with the particular demands of different writing tasks seeming to fall into place as the composition unfolds, as, in Murray's words, "writing finds its own meaning" (1980, p. 20) . This faith in general procedural knowledge is shared now by Warriner's English Composition and Grammar: Fifth Course, which in the 1988 version includes sections on general topic-finding procedures-such as, keeping a journal, brainstorming, clustering, and asking the five what-how questions-and advises students to "Be sure to go through each stage in the writing process: prewriting, writing a first draft, evaluating, revising, proofreading, and writing a final version" (p. 32). Through engagement in these procedures, the text assumes, students will be able to perform well regardless of the tasks and contexts in which they apply them.
The Argument for Task-Specific Knowledge The view of writing as a general, all-purpose process is endorsed widely (Applebee, 1986). Yet, like the theory of general heuristics forwarded by Polya and others, the notion of general, transferable writing knowledge has come under question. The second position that we will review holds that composing knowledge is particular to different types of tasks and that, contrary to the notion that a general expository model or general set of procedures is sufficient, different types of tasks require different types of knowledge. Like the general knowledge position, the task-specific knowledge position is divided by the issue of whether the knowledge should concern form or procedures.
The argument for task-specific knowledge related to form is simply one that broadens the position originally taken by Warriner and Griffith (1977) . Rather than holding that most people engage primarily in exposition, this position identifies a set of writing forms that people can learn and use whenever engaging in related types of tasks. This position has ancient roots that date back to the Greek academies of antiquity in which students memorized the orations of their masters. Today's version of this approach appears in the modern endorsement of the four classical forms of discourse: exposition, argumentation, description, and narration. Instruction in these forms presumes that each has a distinct set of traits that can be best learned by reading exemplary models, analyzing their characteristic elements, and then reproducing them in independent essays (Eschholz, 1980) . The four classical forms often are expanded to include a variety of different text structures including the business letter, the film review, the comparison/contrast essay, the Shakespearean sonnet, and many others. Typically, however, the instructional approach is product centered, with students studying and imitating exemplary models.
The modern emphasis on process has resulted in dissatisfaction with productrelated instruction in task or form, and several theorists have suggested a procedural alternative to implementing task-related instruction. Chief among them have been Hillocks (1975 Hillocks ( , 1982 Hillocks ( , 1984 Hillocks ( , 1986a Hillocks ( , 1986b Hillocks ( , 1987 These strategies are unique to the definition task; one would not employ them in analyzing the causes of the French Revolution. A teacher, these theorists argue, should not teach a few all-purpose strategies that enable writers to produce a definition, a business memo, and a short story; a teacher should conduct a task analysis (Hillocks et al., 1971; Johannessen et al., 1982) to identify the skills needed for successful performance in a particular writing task and to design activities that teach students the appropriate set of strategies. Hillocks concludes from his metaanalysis of exemplary experimental composition studies conducted from 1963-1983 (1984, 1986a, 1987 ) that an instructional focus that teaches writers task-specific composing procedures is the most effective of the focuses contrasted. Hillocks has labeled treatments that involve students in the inductive analysis of concrete materials in order to develop task-specific strategies an inquiry focus. He has argued strongly-too strongly, some feel (i.e., Durst, 1987; Newkirk, 1987 )-that such instruction should supercede other approaches, particularly those that proceed from assumptions concerning the efficacy of general procedural knowledge.
Hillocks had argued previously (1982), in a manner similar to Murray's (1987) , that writers in divergent disciplines engaged in scientific inquiry share certain basic strategies: "observing, describing, generalizing, comparing and contrasting (defining), hypothesizing, and testing generalizations" (p. 664). However, whereas Murray argues that knowledge of these skills is sufficient to guide all writing, Hillocks has contended that the complexity and demands of particular tasks require more specialized knowledge. Hillocks (1986b) has described writing tasks that involve processes quite different from the scientific process of inquiry. Writing a fable, for instance, requires writers to develop strategies for producing personification, narration, exaggeration, and so on suggesting that the two types of tasks involve quite different declarative and procedural knowledge of content and form. All of these tasks might indeed involve a voyage out and a voyage in, but the task-specific knowledge position asserts that the astute composer/pilot will board appropriate vehicles and employ particular procedures for negotiating the unique atmospheres and obstacles encountered in these vastly different environments. Applebee (1986) argues that composition knowledge is task-specific, although he disagrees with some of Hillocks's distinctions between instructional modes and focuses. He argues that process approaches to teaching, although a preferable alternative to the prescriptive, product-centered methods of texts such as the older versions of English Grammar and Composition, have been badly underconceptualized, have been inadequate, and have been "embraced simplistically and naively" (p. 97). Applebee finds the reduction of process instruction to simple formulas regarding general stages of writing to be insufficient and misguided. He argues that, among the writers he has studied, "The choice of appropriate strategies was driven by the task at hand-not by a generalized conception of the 'writing process' that the writers used in all contexts" (p. 102). He continues, Process activities are not appropriate for all writing tasks ... and even when such activities are needed, different tasks will pose different problems and require in turn somewhat different writing processes. Some tasks require much planning and organizing before the writer can begin; some require careful editing before being shared with a critical audience; some involve sharing of familiar experiences within welllearned formats and require no further process supports at all. Indeed, the universe of writing tasks, both in and out of school, is large and diverse. Essay exams require Smagorinsky and Smith one set of approaches, research papers another. The journalist dictating a latebreaking story over the telephone writes in one way, the short story writer in another. In part because studies of writing processes have ignored this diversity, processoriented instruction easily degenerates into an inappropriate and lockstep formula. If instruction is not conceptualized to make the link between process and product explicit and real, the approach is easily trivialized. Rather than suggesting a range of strategies for solving problems, process instruction will become just another series of practice exercises.
The task-specific knowledge position, then, argues for differentiated instruction, dependent on the particular demands of individual tasks. Advocates of this position would dispute Murray's (1980) notion that a writer can approach a poem and a memo in the same way and with the same procedures. Indeed, those who endorse this position would undoubtedly argue that even different types of poems-a sonnet, a free verse poem, a limerick, or virtually any other poetic type-would require unique knowledge, with each variation (i.e., different types of sonnets) requiring yet more specialized knowledge. Pedagogy based on the assumption that composing knowledge is task-specific requires an analysis of the particular knowledge required for each type of composition and explicit instruction in the appropriate set of procedures.
The Argument for Community-Specific Knowledge
The task-specific knowledge position asserts that particular tasks require particular types of knowledge. A third position holds that, even if one accepts the need for task-related knowledge, writers in different communities produce texts of similar structure in quite different ways because of the demands and customs of the particular communities in which they participate. Pauline Kael (1985) and Antonin Scalia (cited in Denniston, 1989), for instance, both write texts that rely on the generation of definitions. They produce them, however, for vastly different purposes and in decidedly different environments.
Film critic Pauline Kael's credibility depends on her ability to evaluate films according to a consistent set of standards, and hence she needs to convey in her reviews her definition of what constitutes quality in film. In her review of Roland Joffe's The Killing Fields, for instance, she offers the following: To consider these questions, we turn to different applications of what is generally known as argumentation. According to Toulmin (1958) , all arguments include claims, data, warrants, propositions, qualifications, and rebuttals. Yet the form these elements take depends on the context in which one argues, both in terms of the conventions one follows and in terms of the particular declarative knowledge needed to persuade experts in the field to accept one's perspective. Most people would agree that declarative knowledge is essential to effective argumentation; Pauline Kael could not become a Supreme Court justice because she lacks an encyclopedic knowledge of legal precedent. Recent research has looked beyond declarative and procedural knowledge and investigated the importance of discourse conventions. An examination of argumentation as employed in two quite different fields, literary criticism and legal brief writing, will illustrate the different values that different communities place on particular argumentative traits.
Fahnestock and Secor (1991) have argued that literary criticism is a unique form of discourse, one which a purist might find deficient in terms of its implementation of argumentative structure:
Though literary arguments may seem flawed when viewed from a distance and by a field-independent standard, they can still be compelling to the audiences for whom they were intended. To identify the sources of their appeal, we must remember that these arguments exist in a particular field, a unique rhetorical situation; they are acts of communication directed at a special audience in a particular kind of forum, and as such they have their own characteristic procedures. Just as political oratory, pulpit homilies, and even advertising copy exploit a limited set of rhetorical possibilities, so also does literary criticism employ a definable repertoire of persuasive tactics to achieve communication in its well-defined environment. Stratman's analysis of legal brief writing (1990) suggests that a different community of writers employs argumentative structure in quite a different way, supporting Toulmin's (1958) view that different situations bring out nuances in the particular argumentative strategy. Stratman maintains that "legal writing is a distinct, unique kind of writing skill [that] can be taught" (p. 196). Stratman's findings about the writing of legal briefs-a particular form of argument-run counter to the widely held view of law schools that general practice in critical reasoning will result in good legal writing. As a consequence of their belief that students can transfer general thinking skills to their writing, law schools rarely give explicit instruction in legal composing.
Stratman (1990) finds this approach misguided, arguing that "What differentiates legal reasoning and argument from ordinary reasoning and argument are the unique rhetorical demands that structure the appellant-appellee (petitioner-respondent) relationships and the way courts may reconstitute opposing arguments in the context of this relationship" (p. 185). Appellate brief writers need to be able to make inferences about certain enduring dispositions common to both judges and their opposing lawyers, should be able to anticipate the ways in which judges and oppo-nents read through a brief, and should be able to simulate the ways in which judges and opponents interpret and integrate information from the brief. Thus, the task of successful legal brief writing requires specialized knowledge in audience characteristics that shape the content and form of the product, a necessary element of legal training that Stratman has found almost absent in law school instruction.
The studies on argumentation by Fahnestock and Secor (1991) and Stratman (1990) suggest the extraordinary complexity of successful writing and support the notion that particular tasks require not just general and task-specific declarative and procedural knowledge but also "knowledge that gives background and definition to [each discipline]-not only 'facts' but the terms of art, operational concepts, canons of relevance, patterns of association, characteristic argumentative gestures, and so on" (Colomb, 1988 Those who accept the community-specific knowledge position must also accept the necessity of conventional knowledge-that is, knowledge of the social or situational understandings that govern behavior under particular circumstances. According to this position, one may know generally how to drive and may know that general driving knowledge must be adjusted when one moves from a stick shift sports car to an automatic transmission recreational vehicle. Yet knowledge of how to drive also depends on knowledge of local customs: One operates a sports car one way on the Autobahn and another way on the Dan Ryan Expressway. Similarly, they would argue, one needs conventional knowledge when composing: the tone, sources of evidence, voice, and so on required to write for a practitioner-oriented journal are quite different from those needed to write for a research journal.
Teachers who adopt the community-specific knowledge position are faced with a daunting instructional problem. They must either instruct students to differentiate their writing in seemingly unlimited ways or be content with having limited influence on student writing. Perkins and Salomon (1988) offer some hope for teachers. They speak of the need for mindful attention to transfer-that is, the conscious and deliberate application of knowledge in contexts other than the one originally studied.
They contend that teachers who "persistently and systematically . . . saturate the context of education with attention to transfer" (p. 29) will improve the likelihood that students will reapply knowledge when they shift domains. This saturation must be an integral part of the class structure rather than a tag at the end of a lesson; Salomon (1987) has found that most students are decidedly unmindful unless specifically and vigorously cued. Teachers who adopt the community-specific knowledge position and who aspire to retain their optimism regarding the range of their influence, then, must work hard at fostering a sense of consistent mindfulness in their students in adapting knowledge to new situations. The belief that "reading is reading" informs the approaches that many teachers take to instruct students in the study of literature. Scholes (1985) notes that professors of literature believe that they are not teachers of reading. They believe that because students have been taught to read in lower grades they are ready to read literature (or at least to hear about literary readings). This assumption also informs the approach taken by many high school texts. The 1989 edition of Scott, Foresman's Patterns in Literature (Farrell, Clapp, & Kuehner, 1989 ) divides its objectives into six major skills areas: application of literary terms, reading skills, vocabulary skills, thinking skills, speaking and listening skills, and writing skills and technique. Although the list of literary terms covered in the book leads off their discussion of objectives, their presentation suggests the authors' confidence that skills and knowledge are transferred readily from one type of text to another. They cite recognizing cause and effect relationships as one of the reading skills students will learn, implying that this skill is similar across text types. They explain that students will practice such thinking skills as classifying and generalizing, implying that this general skill is transferable across disciplines. And even their statement of the literary terms addressed in the text suggests that they do not see reading different literary genres as requiring specialized skills or strategies. They distinguish literary terms from reading skills, implying that, while reading literature may require some specialized knowledge, it involves essentially the same processes as does any other kind of reading.
One implication of the belief in general reading skills is that literature instruction should help students develop the procedural knowledge that they need to read any new text. However, the distinction between the study of reading and literature that Scholes (1985) contends characterizes university curricula, a distinction that is in large measure replicated in the secondary schools, suggests that this implication has, in large measure, been rejected. Instead, the belief in general knowledge manifests itself in the belief that students of literature already have in place the skills and strategies they need to have meaningful transactions with literature. Interestingly, this belief has a number of its own instructional implications, implications often radically at odds with one another. Teachers holding such a belief in general knowledge might argue that, because students have the skills and strategies they need to read literature, teachers need only provide the occasion for exchange about the literature that the class reads together. Others might argue that it is a teacher's obligation to provide the knowledge that students undoubtedly do not have, knowledge of technical vocabulary, say, or declarative knowledge about author and text. Although recent research by Many and Wiseman (1992) suggests that these approaches need not be incompatible, as we noted in our discussion of composition, the belief in general knowledge is shared by theorists and teachers who seem to share little else.
Other researchers and theorists who have studied response to literature reject the idea that all reading is the same and seek instead to describe literary reading. However, while they may identify literary reading as a new domain, much of this research is marked by a belief in the applicability of general knowledge within that domain. For example, Rosenblatt (1938 Rosenblatt ( , 1978 , certainly the most influential theorist on research in response to literature, draws a distinction between efferent and aesthetic reading. According to Rosenblatt, readers who adopt an efferent stance are concerned primarily with what they will take away from the reading, a concern that manifests itself in treating the text as information. Readers who adopt an aesthetic stance, on the other hand, are concerned with what they are living through while they are reading a text. Rosenblatt maintains that, although any text can be read with either an efferent or aesthetic stance, literature offers unique possibilities for aesthetic transactions. In drawing this distinction, Rosenblatt moves away from the reading is reading view. However, she does not distinguish what readers must do to have aesthetic transactions with different literary genres, and thus she still places her faith in general procedural knowledge for responding to literature. Gevinson's (1990) study of four professors of English, thinking aloud as they read three stories, took a different tack to investigate literary understanding, but it shares the belief in general knowledge. Gevinson argues that literary understanding is a coherent concept, noting that despite differences in training, speciality, critical allegiance, age, and gender all of his readers seemed to share a conception of literary understanding very similar to the formalist theory of R. S. Crane. In a follow-up study (1991), he reanalyzed the protocols of his readers in an attempt to define expertise in reading literature. He identified five dimensions of expert behavior: stance; sense of the whole to be understood; declarative knowledge base; procedural knowledge base; and attitudes, habits and beliefs. He suggested that recognizing these dimensions of general literary knowledge can provide direction for curriculum planners.
Although a growing body of research makes the case for general knowledge by seeking to characterize literary reading, this research and theory has had less impact on curricula than did the broader general knowledge position that reading is essentially the same regardless of what is being read. Indeed, while some researchers are calling for more attention to the instructional implications of general literary knowledge (Probst, 1991; Squire, 1989) Although little research has been conducted to evaluate particular approaches to teaching literature, several studies have investigated the effects of helping students develop task-specific knowledge. Smith (1989) found that giving students direct instruction in the interpretive strategies that Booth (1974) claims experienced readers use to understand irony significantly improved students' ability to understand ironic poetry, as measured by performance on an objective test and by responses to interview questions. In essence, Booth argues that authors alert readers to the presence of irony through five types of clues and that, once alerted, readers employ particular strategies to reconstruct ironic meanings. In Smith's study, students were taught the clues and strategies through the use of songs, short poems, and excerpts of poems before applying them independently to longer and more difficult poems. In addition to increasing students' understanding of ironic poetry, Hillocks (1989) found that such an approach resulted in substantially higher levels of engagement in classroom discussions than did a more traditional approach to teaching poetry. Further, Smith (1991, in press) has found that giving students direct instruction in the conventions experienced readers employ to understand unreliable narrators may help students become more active interpreters of meaning.
According to these theorists and researchers, having general knowledge does not guarantee that one can experience a meaningful transaction with a literary text. They therefore see the job of teachers of literature as determining what kinds of literature students need to know how to read, identifying strategies necessary for reading them, and designing instruction to teach the strategies. This position assumes that students will employ these strategies whenever the need arises, that once they have been taught strategies for, say, interpreting irony they will recognize and interpret irony in their subsequent independent reading.
Although the theorists and researchers who emphasize the importance of taskspecific knowledge believe that helping students develop that knowledge is a way to increase students' textual power, critics could object that such instruction in fact places unjustified limits on students' interpretations. In the first place, a belief in the existence of generalizable interpretive operations, even in particular domains, would result in instruction that would emphasize the conventional at the expense of the idiosyncratic. In the second place, instruction based on an analysis of the demands of particular kinds of texts necessarily places texts into genres. Teachers who use texts to teach strategies, then, preempt students from making their own judgments about the nature of the texts that they read. Perhaps most significantly, critics of this position might echo the concern of those who argue against emphasizing task-specific knowledge in composition instruction (i.e., Atwell, 1987) Appleman (in press) offers another way that teachers can clarify the impact of community membership on interpretation. She calls for teaching students how to look through different critical lenses. She explains the results of teaching upper level, high school students to look at literature from four perspectives: reader-response, structuralist, Marxist, and feminist. Students' comments on how the course changed their reading are in line with Fish's (1980) argument. One wrote: "These literary theories, or critical lenses, will like change the meaning of the text to the reader" (Appleman, in press). Another wrote: "A book is not just black ink on paper-it's creation, feelings and images that you as the reader, reading through the lenses of Marxism, feminism, structuralism, and reader-response as well as others I don't know yet, make them out to be" (Appleman, in press ). This student went on to suggest that the course be renamed "Through the Eyes of the Beholder."
Fish's (1980) notion of interpretive communities suggests that instruction should be centered on exploring the consequences of people's choosing to read in certain ways rather than on recognizing and accepting the invitation to read in conventional ways. Fish's own work, as well as the work of Bleich (1978 Bleich ( , 1988 and Appleman (in press), suggests that teachers could make this exploration in several ways: by articulating the assumptions that guide their own reading, by helping students identify the communities to which they belong, and by helping students experience the impact that membership in different communities has on their reading. Critics (i.e., Booth, 1983) of this kind of instruction would argue that Fish's theory has unfortunate ethical consequences, for, by privileging the creative activity of the reader, it underestimates the benefits that attending to great imaginative works provides.
As in the case of composition, belief in community-specific knowledge forces teachers to recognize the limits of the consequences of their instruction. Teachers of literature who take this position believe that they are teaching a way to read literature rather than the way to read literature. They also are participating in a long-standing and often rancorous debate on the nature of meaning and where it resides, a complete accounting of which extends far beyond the scope of this essay.
Conclusion
The debates about the specificity of knowledge that are raging in educational psychology raise issues that lie below the surface of discussions about how to investigate and teach composition and literary understanding. However, while the various antagonists in educational psychology have explicated their positions, these issues typically are unarticulated in discussions of literacy. Our primary purpose in identifying three positions regarding the specificity of knowledge-the case for general knowledge, the case for task-specific knowledge, and the case for community-specific knowledge-is to give voice to this silent debate. We believe that both researchers and teachers of literacy will benefit from articulating the principles that provide the underpinnings of their work.
We have found, in fact, that the distinctions have value as a heuristic. Our work on this review has caused us to reconsider our own teaching, especially our teaching in secondary schools. As our citations of our own work suggest, we have focused in our research and publications on how to develop task-specific knowledge, a focus that also dominated our high school teaching. Our students might have been better served had we considered more carefully the general and community-specific knowledge that they needed in addition to the task-specific knowledge we helped them develop. But like many teachers, although we did not declare allegiance to one of the positions in principle, we did so in practice. And the demands of our high schools' already crowded curricula gave us little reason or opportunity to think about what more we could do. This is not to say that we believe the distinctions are absolute. In fact, we agree with those who have argued that drawing dichotomies (or trichotomies) serves rhetorical rather than theoretical and practical purposes and therefore have striven to take a conciliatory view in the dispute about the nature of knowledge in learning. Perkins and Salomon (1989) assert that "there are general cognitive skills; but they always function in contextualized ways" (p. 19). They caution against taking a winner-takeall stance in such disputes and argue in favor of a search for theoretical compatibility. Some researchers involved in basic (as opposed to instructional) research on reading and writing processes (i.e., Flower, 1987; ) have constructed models that include general processes, such as setting goals and drawing on prior knowledge. They view these processes, however, as subject to external factors, such as the task environment and the social context of learning. These environmental factors mediate if, when, and how a process is instantiated in reading or writing, leading the researchers ultimately to take a sociocognitive view of literacy (Flower, 1992) .
However, though the positions may be compatible, we believe that the distinctions we have made are especially crucial for planners of curricula. Although basic research has examined general processes at all levels of age, schooling, and expertise, instructional research on the three positions suggests a curricular path (i.e., see, Carter, 1990 ). The general knowledge position is most widely substantiated at the elementary level, the task-specific position is best supported at the secondary and Nature of Knowledge collegiate levels, and the community-specific position is most typically investigated at the upper levels of schooling and in the professions. And this makes sense. A base of general knowledge is necessary for learners to engage in specific writing and reading tasks. Both general and task-specific knowledge are likely to be prerequisite for membership in specialized discourse communities. We call this a curricular path, rather than a developmental one, because we see the acquisition of increasingly specialized knowledge as a function of instruction (whether formal or informal) rather than of age.
Our review, therefore, provides something of a paradox. It articulates distinctions among the positions taken by researchers, theorists, and teachers. But instead of resulting in more disputes, identifying these distinctions may help resolve arguments, at least as they are played out in the planning of curricula. Indeed, we believe that curricula and instruction that neglect any of the three types of knowledge we have identified neglect students as well.
